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Chapter 5
Eﬀect of Emotion and Personality on Deviation
from Purely Rational Decision-Making
Marina Fiori, Alessandra Lintas, Sarah Mesrobian, and Alessandro E.P. Villa
Abstract. Human decision-making has consistently demonstrated deviation from
“pure” rationality. Emotions are a primary driver of human actions and the cur-
rent study investigates how perceived emotions and personality traits may aﬀect
decision-making during the Ultimatum Game (UG). We manipulated emotions by
showing images with emotional connotation while participants decided how to split
money with a second player. Event-related potentials (ERPs) from scalp electrodes
were recorded during the whole decision-making process. We observed significant
diﬀerences in the activity of central and frontal areas when participants oﬀered
money with respect to when they accepted or rejected an oﬀer. We found that par-
ticipants were more likely to oﬀer a higher amount of money when making their de-
cision in association with negative emotions. Furthermore, participants were more
likely to accept oﬀers when making their decision in association with positive emo-
tions. Honest, conscientious, and introverted participants were more likely to accept
oﬀers. Our results suggest that factors others than a rational strategy may predict
economic decision-making in the UG.
5.1 Behavioural Economics of Ultimatum Game and Emotion
Traditional economic models emphasise the importance of rational choices [115].
In this framework humans could be replaced by “rational agents”, being purely
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self-interested and described as “cold gain maximiser”, or Homo Economicus [112].
According to these models, when a rational agent chooses between two options, it
will compute the utility of outcome of both choices, estimate their probability of
occurrence, and finally select the one that oﬀers the highest gain. This assumption
sets the foundation of the existence of “utility functions” capable to compute an
“expected” value. The perceived value of a good can be considered equivalent to a
measure of satisfaction and to the expectation to attain specific outcomes. Such a
framework is rooted in the Western world and well illustrated by the famous state-
ment made by the Swiss mathematician Gabriel Cramer on 21 May 1728. At that
time he was in London and addressing a letter to his compatriot and fellow mathe-
matician Nicolas Bernouilli in Basel he wrote:
The mathematicians estimate money in proportion to its quantity, and men of good
sense in proportion to the usage that they may make of it [97].
Indeed, in the “Theory of the Consumer” it is assumed that rational individuals
maximise the consumption of real goods given a limited availability of nominal
goods (money) [103, 104]. Then, according to the initial assumptions,the observed
choice is the best way to infer the underlying consumer’s maximised utility function,
i.e. their “willingness-to-pay”:
Utility is taken to be correlative to Desire or Want. It has been already argued that
desires cannot be measured directly, but only indirectly, by the outward phenomena to
which they give rise: and that in those cases with which economics is chiefly concerned
the measure is found in the price which a person is willing to pay for the fulfilment or
satisfaction of his desire [81].
Rather than performing empirical tests of the utility maximisation hypothesis,
much research has taken for granted that the expected value is equivalent to the
revealed preference [59]. However, there is little empirical evidence concerning
whether individual demands satisfy the revealed preference axioms [49]. In contrast,
research has shown that human behaviour is far from being economically rational
and humans failed to reproduce the behaviour of the pure rational agents. One of the
main reason of this finding is that goals and wishes may change, adapt or even van-
ish in a very short time. These observations opened a way to new research paradigms
emphasising heuristics and biases in decision-making under uncertainty and choice
under risk. This new approach led to the development of “prospect theory” and the
concept of “bounded rationality” [15, 63]. According to this theory, people make
decisions based on the potential worth of the losses and the advantages and make
decisions applying individual heuristics derived from one’s experience and learning.
A further step for the development of a more comprehensive framework of be-
havioural economics is achieved by including the social dimension. Human sub-
jects develop and evolve within a social framework and their sense of rationality
cannot be separated from the outcome of interpersonal interactions. Living in a so-
cial world, there is no scarcity of situations in which we give and take, buy and
sell. While doing their shopping, people have their own money at their disposal and
if their willingness-to-pay for a certain item lies above the owner’s willingness-to-
sell, then money and item are transferred, otherwise no deal is made. One party, the
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“proposer”, oﬀers to sell an item with the intention to maximise his income, and
the other party, the “responder”, can either accept or reject the oﬀer with the inten-
tion to maximise his saving. Let us assume that responder’s savings correspond to
an income that the responder made in another transaction when he played the party
of a proposer. If we extend this concept to real-life situations we can assume that
each party is driven to maximise his income and his saving iteratively in a sequence
of transactions. The maximisation of income and savings can be achieved by max-
imising the “willingness-to-share ”. Such a real-life situation may occur when one
party, the proposer, oﬀers how to split a limited resource (e.g., a sum of money). If
the other party, the responder, accepts the deal, the resource is distributed according
to the proposal, and if he rejects, both parties get nothing. This kind of situation is
close to an iterative implementation of the Ultimatum Game (UG) [46], which is
originally a one-shot bargaining game with no communication and no negotiation.
According to Game Theory, the subgame perfect equilibrium in the Ultimatum
Game [102] is that the proposer oﬀers the smallest possible amount (in order to
save as much as possible), and the responder accepts any amount (because a small
amount is better than nothing). A selfish income-maximiser should accept all of-
fers, even very low, as it is always a positive gain. Anticipating such a rationale of
the responder, the proposer should always oﬀer the smallest possible amount to the
responder and keep the largest possible amount for himself. Experimental findings
do not confirm this prediction. Interestingly, rather than assuming they are play-
ing with “rational” players and, thereby, proposing very lopsided divisions, most
proposers oﬀer to share the sum in a proportion close to 50/50. Proposers tend to
oﬀer rather fair oﬀers and responders’ tend to reject oﬀers that are judged as un-
fair (e.g., less than 20 percent of the total amount), even under large increases in
stakes [14, 109] despite this being an irrational behaviour with respect to gain max-
imisation [51, 100].
This deviation from “rational” strategies that are suggested by game-theoretic
analysis can be explained by the fact that humans cannot put aside the assumption
of being in a multi-player, multi-round environment they are accustomed to in the
real world. Such environment includes “irrational” concepts such as fairness and
adaptation to societal expectations [19] and is in agreement with the concept of
“willingness-to-share”. The substantial role played by emotions in decision-making
and behaviour in a multi-player environment is expressed by concepts like “fair-
ness” and “social sharing” that involve the description of an emotional event by the
person who experienced it to another person in a socially-shared language [74]. It
appears that the proposers behave as they know already they are playing with “emo-
tional” rather than “rational” players. Lopsided divisions are not often proposed but,
when they are, they are often rejected. Both proposers and responders do not behave
according to pure rationality and make decisions far from the Homo Economicus’s
rational choice. An hypothesis that has been suggested to explain this divergence
is that participants to UG behave according to the logic of fairness and reciprocity,
thus punishing unfair players by refusing low oﬀers [34, 35]. A “fair” share is “ir-
rationally” expected by the participants and they will accept nothing less. The fact
that reciprocity plays a role in economical decision-making is also supported by
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the fact that the rejection rate is lower when the proposer is a computer rather than a
human being [118] suggesting that “retaliation” is specifically addressed to other hu-
man beings rather than to virtual players. Fairness and reciprocity are mental biases
observed across all human cultures. They are likely to be determined by learning
by “imitation”, which is the earliest interpersonal behaviour occurring before the
end of brain maturation, and the possibility to build-up cross-temporal contingen-
cies [1, 38, 61]. Whether these biases are the foundation of a human innate moral
psychology or not is a question that goes beyond the scope of this study.
Emotions are powerful drives that aﬀect the decision to accept or reject a mon-
etary oﬀer. For instance, participants who were induced to feel sadness were more
likely to reject unfair oﬀers in a monetary exchange game [50]. Research on ne-
gotiation behaviour includes the investigation about how emotions and emotional
display aﬀect interdependent decision-making. In this context emotional states and
the display of emotions are regarded as predictors of negotiated outcomes [70]. Af-
fect can be used as a cue that discriminates between options [110] and that eval-
uates the attributes of an option (e.g., the attractiveness or prestige) even prior to
decision-making [60, 77]. Displayed emotions, whether positive or negative, may
influence social interactions because they convey satisfaction with the behaviour of
other player. Furthermore, displayed emotions influence strategic information pro-
cessing [36] and may serve as means of persuasion. In a UG study, induced pos-
itive emotions appear to increase cooperative behaviour while negative aﬀect may
have an opposed impact [95]. People in negotiation seem to reciprocate their op-
ponent’s emotions [66]. They get angry when confronted with an angry opponent
and happy when confronted with a happy opponent [37]. In other UG studies it
was observed that proposers who displayed negative emotions elicited by emotional
faces, prior to making an oﬀer, were more likely to reject oﬀers when they played
the role of responders than those displaying either neutral or positive emotions [70].
Primates tend to identify themselves with the other party in most interpersonal in-
teractions [41,99]. Then, the strong aﬀective power associated with emotional faces
may bias the study of emotions sensu stricto on decision-making.
This Chapter is organised as follows. In relation with decision-making processes
we review at first the background of the neurobiology of emotion in Section 5.2
and, secondly, the main characteristics of the brain electric signals –event-related
potentials– recorded on human scalp in Section 5.3. The detailed description of the
experimental task aimed at studying the eﬀect of emotions evoked by non-figurative
pictures in the Ultimatum Game paradigm is described in Section 5.4. In Section
5.5 we present the behavioural and the electrophysiological results. A discussion is
added in Section 5.6.
5.2 Neurobiology of Emotion and Decision-Making
Decision-making is considered the most essential phase in volitional act. This
is supposed to occur in the temporal window that follows sensory processes [23] and
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before the motor response confirms that a decision was made. Patients suﬀering cer-
tain brain lesions tend to make “bad” decisions, even when biases and heuristics of
normal “irrational” subjects are taken into consideration. Decision-making is overall
impaired in certain patients as if they were unable to learn from previous mistakes
or if they were unable to process correctly the perceived information [4, 25]. Un-
derstanding the neural basis of decision-making processes (the Somatic Markers
Hypothesis) is a key question which is generally investigated by searching where
and how a “decision” is made in a recursive way.
Neuroimaging techniques applied to the investigation of the neurobiological ba-
sis of economic games suggest that the brain employs multiple systems of processes
in decision-making [3, 98, 106, 126]. These studies focused on the identification of
the respective rational and emotional contributions to decision-making, despite the
fact that cognition and aﬀect might be considered inseparable [29]. Cognitive-based
judgements underlying decision-making were investigated taking into consideration
language, attention, and working memory systems [105]. Cognition may be regu-
lated by aﬀect [111] and mood [101]. In many types of decision processes, including
moral judgement [71] and economic decision-making [106], experimental observa-
tions reported the activation of an emotional pathway in the brain. The neurobiolog-
ical studies of the entire process of decision-making during economic tasks, from
the initial perception of a “stimulus” (which conveys new information and/or new
investment options), to valuation and motivation, and the very act of choosing, high-
light the limitations of utility theory postulated by standard economic models [8].
Figure 5.1 illustrate the main areas involved in processing and integration of emo-
tional information [12, 108].
Certain regions of the brain are activated when perceiving unfairness. In partic-
ular, the bilateral anterior insula, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) were involved in processing unfair oﬀers from
human proposers [106].
In the same study participants that showed stronger anterior insula activation to
unfair oﬀers rejected a higher proportion of these oﬀers. This result may support the
assumption that neural representations of emotional states guide human behaviour.
Interestingly, the anterior insula is often associated with negative emotional states
such as pain, distress or disgust.
The DLPFC appears to be an area involved in planning ahead, goal maintenance
and executive control [38,83,106]. The observation that unfair oﬀers tended to acti-
vate DLPFC [106] suggested that this area may be associated with the representation
and active maintenance of the cognitive demands of the task, achieving the maxi-
mum amount of money. In addition, rejecting unfair oﬀers in the UG was associated
with higher physiological activation as measured by skin conductance [118].
In the Ultimatum Game ACC activity can be associated with the detection of a
cognitive conflict, such as presence of contrasting responses and may reflect the
conflict between cognitive and emotional motivations [9]. The ACC, a structure
located on the medial surface of the frontal lobes (Fig. 5.1) has diverse functions.
It can be subdivided into areas related to cognition and aﬀect [13, 114]. The dorsal
regions of the ACC represent the cognitive subdivision, being crucial for error
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Fig. 5.1 Human brain illustration of lateral surface of the right cerebral hemisphere (A),
medial surface of the left cerebral hemisphere (B) and the inferior view (C).
processing [18] and for mediating processes such as response inhibition [13].
Caudo-dorsal regions of ACC share further connections with other neural
systems involved in reward processing and decision-making, such as the mesen-
cephalic dopamine system [24] and the orbitofrontal cortex [55]. The rostro-ventral
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ACC corresponds to the aﬀective subdivision, and is connected to the amygdala, pe-
riaqueductal gray, nucleus accumbens, hypothalamus, hippocampus, anterior insula
and orbitofrontal cortex [28]. ACC activation upon receiving low oﬀers in the UG
can also be associated with unfairness, i.e. the occurrence of outcomes that are not
as good as expected [56].
5.3 Event Related Potentials
Electroencephalography (EEG) is the most widely used method to record human
brain activity with high temporal resolution (1 ms time scale) in a non-invasive way
from the human scalp by means of external electrodes placed over many standard
locations determined by skull landmarks. Transient electric potentials associated
in time with a physical or mental occurrence are termed event-related potentials
(ERPs) [94]. The ERP is extracted from the ongoing EEG by means of signal filter-
ing and averaged over many responses to a triggering event associated with cognitive
activity involved in stimulus processing and/or action preparation. Although ERPs
can be evaluated in both frequency and time domains, we focus attention on ERPs
recorded in the time domain, i.e. the curves obtained by averaging electric potential
shifts as a function of time over several trials and across participants. In the temporal
domain “early” and “late” components of ERPs [113] have been extensively studied
and recognizee in the vast majority of experimental paradigms.
The early responses (10–50 ms after the triggering event) reflect the activity of
sub-cortical circuits and primary cortical areas. Physical features of the stimulus are
the main determinants of a large complex of waves labelled N75-P100-N145, with
latencies peaking at about 75, 100 and 145 ms recorded over the posterior region
of the scalp. These waveforms are considered “exogenous” components thought to
reflect the physical characteristics of the eliciting event in the external world. At la-
tencies starting around 150 ms from the eliciting event the waveforms contain ERP
components considered as “endogenous”, thought to be associated with brain activ-
ity that may or may not be invoked by the eliciting event. The diﬀerence between
ERPs to attended vs. unattended stimuli shows a negative diﬀerence (Nd) peaking
at a latency of 140–200 ms. The negative diﬀerence is formed by an early poste-
rior component (Nd1), which is associated with a process comparing the sensory
input and an attentional trace in the primary sensory cortex, and a fronto-central
component (Nd2), which is related to the control and maintenance of the attentional
trace [42].
A positive component occurring in the interval between 150 and 280 ms and
peaking at about 200 ms after the stimulus onset is called P200 (or P2). The visual
P200 can be measured by electrodes over the anterior and central sites of the scalp,
and over the parieto-occipital region, but it is usually maximal over the frontal
region. In addition to be a part of the normal response to visual stimuli P200 is mod-
ulated during performance of cognitive tasks associated with visual search in mem-
ory or language context and attentional processes. It has been suggested that P200
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is related to higher-order processes that involve the comparison of the eliciting event
of the ERP with its internal representation or expectation [32, 78]. A recent study
showed a P200 component, presumably generated by orbitofrontal cortex, associ-
ated with an economic decision and its occurrence was thought to reflect an early
assessment of the outcome with P200 amplitude correlated with risk-taking [96].
P200 is also associated with emotional evaluation [16], in particular with the sub-
jective negative valence of emotional images, the stronger emotional negativity the
larger P200 amplitude [17]. Anger faces elicited greater P200 amplitudes than pain
and neutral faces [44].
A negative deflection or shift is observed in the ERP at latencies peaking ap-
proximately at 250-300 ms when subjects receive feedback information about the
correctness of the performance [33, 39]. This error-related negativity is likely to
be associated with a general neural process involved in error detection in diﬀerent
situation and contributes to the diﬀerence between correct and incorrect feedback
conditions (i.e. Go-NoGo task) [84].
Depending on the sensory modality and on the experimental protocol the compo-
nents may vary in peak latency and amplitudes, such that it should rather be better
to consider this error-related negativity corresponding to a family of negativities re-
lated to a mismatch as a whole, such as the Mismatch Negativity [31, 88], N400
[72, 73], medial frontal negativity and feedback error-related negativity [40, 58].
Then, this complex of error-related negativity components may be referred to as
feedback-related negativity (FRN).
FRN has been proposed to reflect a neural response to negative reward predic-
tion errors [56] and it is associated with reinforcement learning based adjustment of
decision values [20]. It is unclear whether the magnitude of the FRN is also modu-
lated by reward expectation. In two studies [58,122], the magnitude of the FRN was
larger when outcomes were unexpected but it remains unclear whether FRN was
associated only to wins or to both wins and losses. In another study, the FRN tended
to be larger for unexpected than expected outcomes but no statistically significant
modulation was observed [47]. FRN has also been observed after outcome-based
adjustment of decision values [22] but larger FRN amplitudes for negative feedback
only emerged significantly for the lowest outcome probability [69]. Using tasks in
which subjects could gamble a small or large amount of money on each trial mone-
tary losses were associated with a larger FRN than monetary gains [124]. However,
the magnitude of the FRN was insensitive to whether the losses were small or large,
such that the FRN appears to be related to the simple bad versus good appraisal
of feedback [48]. On the opposite, there is an evidence FRN is modulated in re-
sponders by fairness of the oﬀer [96]. The amplitude of FRN was more pronounced
for unfair oﬀers, and this was accentuated for participants with high concern of
fairness [7]. The precise source localisation of such a complex ERP component is
controversial [91] but FRN amplitude tends to be maximal at fronto-central scalp
electrode sites [47] the main generator is likely to be located in the dorsal regions of
the ACC [85].
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5.4 The Present Study
The aim of the present research is to further extend the understanding of emotional
reactions in economic decision-making by investigating the role of basic emotions
(happiness, anger, fear, disgust, surprise, and sadness) [30] and personality traits in
an iterative sequence of trials based on the Ultimatum Game [45]. This task has been
widely used to investigate human interaction, in particular the diﬀerences between
behaviour expected according to the “rational” model of game theory and observed
“irrational” behaviour. Yet, very few studies have looked at the eﬀect of emotions
and personality on players’s economic behaviour [106]. In the current study, par-
ticipants played the UG using a computer interface while abstract images were dis-
played in the background of the computer monitor.
We wanted to study whether and how the emotional feelings elicited by those
images could aﬀect participants’ decision-making while they were engaged in
proposing or accepting an oﬀer. In addition, we investigated the role of individual
diﬀerences, in particular the personality characteristics of honesty-humility, emo-
tionality, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experi-
ence [2] as factors potentially aﬀecting the willingness-to-share. We also explore the
neurobiological correlates of the decision-making process, extending our previous
study [113]. In particular, we present here the ERPs associated with sub-processes
of emotional salience detection (P200), combining incoming information into an
emerging emotional representation (FRN), as well as decision-making stages (as
indicated by behavioural results) in all participants.
5.4.1 Participants
Thirteen volunteers (all males, aged 18-44 years, M = 27.6± 1.8 yrs.1) took part
in the study. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, none reported a history
of sustained head injury, and all were naive to the Ultimate Game. They were
informed about the UG test at the beginning of the study and provided written
consent for their participation in line with the Declaration of Helsinki [117].
The participants were comfortably seated in a sound- and light-attenuated room,
watched a computer-controlled monitor at a distance of 57 cm, and were instructed
to maintain their gaze on the center of the monitor throughout the experiment.
Participants volunteered to participate in the study and played with virtual money.
They were not incentivated by a real payoﬀ, their motivation being the challenge to
get the best score and contribute to scientific investigation. Our choice to avoid a
real payoﬀ was also motivated by the contrasting results reported on the association
of performance with a real payoﬀ [43].
1 M± SEM, Mean ± Standard Error of the Mean.
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5.4.2 Experimental Task
The Ultimatum Game (UG) is an anonymous, single-shot two-player game, in which
the “proposer” (Player 1) has a certain sum of money at his disposal and must pro-
pose a share to the “responder” (Player 2). The responder can either accept or re-
ject this oﬀer. If the responder accepts the proposal, the share is done accordingly.
However, if the responder refuses, both players end up with nothing. In the origi-
nal version [45] the game ends after the responder’s decision. In our version each
participant played both the role of the proposer (90 trials, Figure 5.2A) and of the
responder (90 trials, Figure 5.2B) in three alternated blocks of 30 trials each. Each
trial started with a preparatory period of 2 seconds during which participants were
instructed to maintain their gaze on a central fixation cross on the computer monitor.
The overall experiment lasted about 70 minutes.
The instructions about the task were provided on the computer monitor and the
UG was implemented using the E-Prime software2. Participants were told to play
the UG trying to maximise their gain as much as possible. Each UG trial involved
a take-it-or-leave-it integer split of 10 Swiss francs (CHF). The decision regarding
whether the responder accepted or refused was conveyed through a face diagram
(a smiley) that either smiled or frowned. Participants in the study played against
a second player that was in fact a computer program (virtual player), even though
participants were not told explicitly (task instructions mentioned a generic “second
player”). The economic strategy implemented by the virtual player was set accord-
ing to a fair strategy such that oﬀers in the range 3–7 occurred equally with a fre-
quency of 14.29% each, and oﬀers of extreme values 1, 2, 8, or 9 CHF occurred
equally with a frequency of 7.15% each. At the end of the session, the participants
were not asked about the other party, but many of them spontaneously reported that
they guessed the other party was another human, the experimenter. If they asked
whether this was true, the experimenter replied that the other party was a virtual
player programmed to play according to observed human strategies. The E-prime
software was used for stimuli presentation, marker sending and response recording
and the instruction were presented in the written form.
In order to investigate the eﬀect of emotions on the willingness-to-share we in-
cluded selected emotional artworks painted by Rose Coleman that were presented
on the computer monitor in the background, while participants made their deci-
sions. Pictures numbered 754, 1079, 1232, 850, 1215 and 1418 in the artist’s cata-
logue (http://www.resecoleman.de/eng/ ) were used in this study. The selection was
proposed by the artist herself. This kind of subtle emotional priming was chosen
to avoid that participants explicitly realised that we were priming an emotional re-
action. In fact, becoming aware of an emotional state may hamper the eﬀect of
emotion on subsequent behaviour. Thus, we asked participants to make their eco-
nomic decisions without mentioning the images in the background. At the end of
the experiment we asked participants to rate the emotional content of the images.
They indicated the degree to which each picture evoked the six basic emotions of
joy, fear, sadness, disgust, anger, and surprise [30] using a scale from 1 = “not at
2 Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg, PA 15215-2821, USA.
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Fig. 5.2 Illustration of the Ultimatum Game task along series composed of two Blocks.
During the first Block the participants acted as proposers (A), whereas during the second
Block the computer made the oﬀer and the participants acted as responders (B).
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all” to 9 = “very much”. We also administered a 60 item personality questionnaire,
the French version of the HEXACO-60 personality questionnaire derived from lex-
ical studies [2]. This questionnaire measures trait-specific facets of the personality
named Honesty-Humility (H: with descriptive adjectives such as sincere, honest,
faithful, loyal, modest/unassuming against sly, deceitful, greedy, pretentious, hypo-
critical, boastful, pompous), Emotionality (E: emotional, oversensitive, sentimental,
fearful, anxious, vulnerable against brave, tough, independent, self-assured, stable),
Extraversion (X: outgoing, lively, extraverted, sociable, talkative, cheerful, active
against shy, passive, withdrawn, introverted, quiet, reserved), Agreeableness (A: pa-
tient, tolerant, peaceful, mild, agreeable, lenient, gentle against ill-tempered, quar-
relsome, stubborn, choleric), Conscientiousness (C: organised, disciplined, diligent,
careful, thorough, precise against sloppy, negligent, reckless, lazy, irresponsible,
absent-minded), and Openness to Experience (O: intellectual, creative, unconven-
tional, innovative, ironic against shallow, unimaginative, conventional).
5.4.3 Electrophysiological Recordings
Continuous EEG was recorded using 60 scalp Ag/AgCl active electrodes3 mounted
on a headcap (NeuroSpec Quick Cap) and referenced to the linked earlobes
(Fig. 5.3). Electrophysiological signals were sampled at 2048 Hz with lower cut-
oﬀ at 0.05 Hz and upper cut-oﬀ at 200 Hz, 24 bit resolution4. Electrode impedances
were kept below 5 kΩ for all recordings. Vertical and horizontal ocular movements
were also recorded using two pairs of bipolar electrodes. Before the begin of the
UG trials we recorded two minutes of EEG with the participants seating quietly
with closed eyes and two minutes with open eyes maintaining their gaze on a cen-
tral fixation cross on the computer monitor. Participants performed all UG trials
while EEG data were recorded.
Markers corresponding to the spacebar press for the begin of a trial (B at time 0,
Fig. 5.2), stimuli presentations (S for proposer and responder oﬀer types, Fig. 5.2),
button press for participant’s response time (RT, Fig. 5.2) and responder’s choice
(CR and HR for virtual player and human responder, respectively, Fig. 5.2) were
generated using E-Prime5 and were inserted in the continuous EEG file. Markers
were used oﬀ-line to segment the continuous EEG data into epochs time-locked to
stimulus onset. The EEG recordings were analysed with the software BrainVision
Analyzer v2.0.26. The EEG signals were automatically cleared of movement arti-
facts in which voltage exceeded 100 μV and the remaining trials were inspected
visually to control for minor artifacts. The epochs were further scanned for contam-
ination by muscular or electrode artifacts and the remaining trials were inspected
visually to control for residual minor artifacts.
3 (ActiveTwo MARK II Biosemi EEG System, BioSemi B.V., Amsterdam, The Nether-
lands).
4 DC amplifiers and software by Biosemi, USA.
5 Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Sharpsburg, PA 15215-2821, USA.
6 Brain Vision LLC, Morrisville, NC 27560, USA.
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A B
Fig. 5.3 The electrode position of a standard 64 channels montage in the international 10/20
system. A: thick circles report to the midline electrodes referred later, see Fig. 5.6. B: thick
circles report to the frontal electrodes referred later, see Fig. 5.7.
ERP analyses were performed on the artifact-free trials, band-pass filtered be-
tween 0.3 and 30 Hz (−48dB/octave). ERPs were obtained by averaging the EEG
signal on an analysis window corresponding to time intervals lasting 1000 ms, start-
ing 200 ms before the stimulus onset (marker S) and with a 200 ms pre-target base-
line. Latencies of the ERP components were measured at the time of the maximum
peak for proposer and responder conditions. For the P200 and FRN components we
focused on the medial (Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz) and the frontal line (F3, F1, Fz, F2, F4)
electrode sites in both proposer and responder conditions (Fig. 5.3).
Blind source separation of a linear mixture of evoked electrophysiological data
into temporally independent and spatially stationary sources was performed using
the independent component analysis (ICA) [79, 80]. The EEGLab 9.0.5.6b imple-
mentation [27] of the extended infomax algorithm was applied with default settings
to ERPs recorded over all 60 electrodes, for all tasks simultaneously. Since the iter-
ative optimisation used in the infomax algorithm has random components (random
weight matrix and random data reordering), three separate runs were performed to
empirically verify results stability. We report here results of ICA components re-
producible from run to run reported in the UG without the emotional priming [87]
because they illustrate the main sources of the brain activity elicited in the proposer
and responder conditions. The “percent total variance accounted for” gives an idea
of how well each ICA component captures the dynamics of the ERP. This can be
obtained for each component by back-projecting the component and computing the
ratio of the variance of (ERP minus backprojection) to the overall variance of the
original ERP.
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5.5 Results
5.5.1 Overall Gain in Each Experimental Condition
Results were analysed through the statistical package SPSS version 19.07 and Stata
version 12.08. The analysis showed that oﬀers were overall centred around the mean
for both virtual (M = 5.0, S D9 = 2.2) and human proposer (M = 5.0, S D = 1.5).
Yet, the observation of frequency of oﬀered values shows a diﬀerent pattern for
the two experimental conditions. Most human proposer’s oﬀers ranged between 6-4
and 5-5, whereas virtual proposer’s oﬀers were set to include a higher number of un-
balanced oﬀers, such as 8-2 and 2-8. Moreover, the number of accepted oﬀers was
significantly higher by human responders (M = 67.1 out of 90 trials, S D= 11.2) than
by virtual responders (M = 51.9, S D = 9.7), as demonstrated by the level of signif-
icance p of the test F that compares whether the two mean values are significantly
diﬀerent: F(1,25) = 13.99, p = 0.00110.
We analysed the total gain obtained by each player and its counterpart in each
experimental condition. Figure 5.4 reveals a characteristic payoﬀ pattern observed
in the UG performed in this study. This figure plots the diﬀerence between human
and virtual counterpart as a function of the total gain obtained by human partici-
pants. Then, a positive value in the ordinate means that the human player earned
more money than the virtual counterplayer, whereas a negative value means the vir-
tual player was winning more money than the human participant. It is interesting
to notice that all participants except one (labelled ‘S1’ in Fig. 5.4) were earning
less money than the virtual player when humans were playing the role of proposer.
Conversely, human responders earned more money than virtual proposers.
Human responders accepted more often the oﬀer than the virtual player did, such
that this strategy of accepting more often led to overall higher gain. Even the partici-
pant labelled ‘S1’ earned more money as responder than proposer, even if he was the
only one to always win over the virtual player. This result clearly showed that in our
paradigm of the Ultimatum Game the responders tended always to earn more than
the proposers, as shown by the red filled circles (human responders’ total gain) on
the right side and blue filled squares (human proposers’ total gain) on the left side of
the abscissa in Fig. 5.4. Another participant, labelled ‘S2’ in Fig. 5.4, behaved in a
diﬀerent way with respect to the other participants of the group. Participant ‘S2’ was
indeed the only one to accept all kind of oﬀers made by the proposer, thus behaving
as a “rational” agent. Because of an equally distributed frequency of equanimous
oﬀered values (i.e. 5-5) and of winning and loosing oﬀers the diﬀerence was zero
between human participant and virtual player in the human responder condition.
7 SPSS Inc., Chicago, Illinois.
8 StataCorp LP, College Station, Texas.
9 SD stands for standard deviation.
10 In this case the p value indicates the probability that the accepted oﬀers from human and
virtual responders are the same is 1 out of 1000, and therefore is very low.
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Fig. 5.4 Scatter plot of the total gain diﬀerence between Human and Virtual counterplayers.
Human players acting as responders are indicated in red filled circles and human proposers in
blue filled squares. The two subjects identified by the arrows showed the strategies discussed
in the text.
To test whether gains diﬀered for the virtual player and human subjects in the
two experimental conditions (virtual proposer and human proposer) we conducted
an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) crossing virtual and human proposer with vir-
tual and human responder on the total gain obtained in each experimental condi-
tion. Participants labelled ‘S1’ and ‘S2’ were excluded from this analysis because
they expressed a kind of outlier behaviour with respect to the vast majority of the
participants. Results (Figure 5.5, left side) showed that human responders gained
more money when the virtual player made an oﬀer and human participants were re-
sponders (M = 357.2, S D = 73.1) rather than when human proposers made an oﬀer
(M = 275.2, S D = 93.0), F(1,25) = 17.79, p < 0.001. The same tendency occurred
when the virtual player played the role of responder (Figure 5.5, right side) but the
amount gained by the virtual player overall did not significantly diﬀer according to
the proposer. Thus, the average overall gain obtained by summing up the gains of
both players was higher in the human responder condition (M = 632.5, S D = 151.8)
than in the human proposer condition (M = 519.2, S D = 96.7), F(1,25) = 5.14,
p = 0.05.
5.5.2 Eﬀects of Emotional Priming
We first analysed whether the average oﬀer made by human proposers diﬀered
according to the emotional images in the background. A one-way ANOVA with
type of image as the independent variable and amount of money oﬀered as the
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Fig. 5.5 Total gain as a function of the human subject (proposer vs. responder) and the
virtual player (proposer vs. responder). Histograms show mean values and standard deviation
computed over 11 participants.
dependent variable showed no significant eﬀect. However, the investigation of dif-
ferences in evaluating the emotional content of images showed that each participant
rated the pictures in a very diﬀerent manner. For example, one of the six images
(number 1418) was perceived as inducing predominantly sadness and fear for par-
ticipant ‘S3’, and predominantly joy and surprise for participant ‘S13’. Thus, for
each participant we employed an idiographic strategy and analysed results accord-
ing to the emotions associated with each picture, rather than the picture itself. We
also observed that one participant ‘S5’ provided the same exact emotional evalua-
tion for each picture and we decided to exclude such subject from further analysis.
We conducted analyses across trials and we corrected for standard errors by clus-
tering trials within each subject. This strategy allowed us to maintain an overall
large number of trials (1080) while considering variability at the individual level
(12 subjects). To investigate the eﬀect of emotion on decision to accept or reject an
oﬀer, we conducted a logistic regression in which we regressed acceptance or re-
jection of the oﬀer on the six basic emotions. The model was significant, as shown
by the likelihood ratio chi-square test, which compares a model with the constant
only to a model with our independent variables, in this case the six basic emotions:
χ2(5,12) = 17.13, p < 0.001, with results showing that human proposers were more
likely to oﬀer a higher amount of money when making their oﬀer in association
with higher levels of joy, whose coeﬃcient was marginally significant: β (12) =
1.13, p = 0.06. These results suggest an association between valence of emotion,
positive in this case, and economical decision.
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To further explore the influence of valence of emotion we analysed how ratings of
the emotions associated with the pictures would aggregate in clusters of emotions
and we found that indeed two clusters of emotions could be identified by aggre-
gating positive emotions, in particular joy and surprise, and negative emotions, in
particular disgust, fear, and sadness. Then we tested whether positive and negative
emotions predicted the amount of money oﬀered by human proposers. The model
was significant, F(1,12) = 4.74, p = 0.05, with results showing that the cluster of
negative emotions predicted the amount of money oﬀered, β (12) = 0.50, p = 0.05.
5.5.3 Eﬀect of Personality on Economic Decision-Making
In order to investigate the eﬀect of personality traits on decision-making in the UG
for each participant we aggregated the total gain earned by the participant and by
the virtual player in each condition and the acceptance (i.e. the total number of
oﬀers accepted) by the responder counterpart. Then we calculated nonparametric
correlations (we used the correlation coeﬃcient Kendall’s tau) with the personal-
ity traits. Personality traits were significantly correlated with economical decision-
making only in the condition of human responder (Table 5.1, correlations above the
diagonal), but not in the condition of human proposer (Table 5.1, correlations below
the diagonal).
These results suggest that personality influenced participants’ strategy as respon-
ders, but it did not aﬀect their strategy as proposers. In this latter case it seems as
if factors others than personality (for example emotion felt while making the de-
cision) influenced participants’ strategy. Regarding personality traits, more honest
individuals gained more, less extraverted individuals accepted more often, and con-
scientiousness appeared the personality trait mostly related to the overall gain.
5.5.4 Event-Related Potentials
The analysis performed so far concerns only four subjects, for we will refrain from
indicating statistical levels of significance. The analysis of the whole sample of sub-
jects is under process and will be presented later as a separate paper. However, we
present the most noticeable results that illustrate several data related with the task-
related brain signals and brain circuits discussed in this study.
The visual inspection of ERPs revealed two distinct components at most elec-
trode sites during both conditions of UG, proposer and responder. The first com-
ponent is an early positive wave with a peak latency of about 200 ms, identified as
‘P200’. The second component is a negative wave peaking at about 350 ms, iden-
tified as Feedback-Related Negativity, ‘FRN’. Figures 5.6A and 5.6B show these
waveforms in response to decision-making eliciting stimuli without [87, 113] and
with emotional priming (studied here), respectively, along the midline at electrode
positions Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz. The amplitude of both waves are larger towards the
frontal areas.
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Table 5.1 This table shows correlations between participants’ gain, computer’s gain, accep-
tance rate, and personality traits (N = 12 participants). Above the diagonal: results for virtual
proposer/human responder. Below the diagonal: results for human proposer/virtual responder.
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Participant gain . .420 .809* .515* .030 -.430 .230 .469* .198
Virtual player gain .210 . -.626** .060 -.150 -.310 -.050 .500* .076
Acceptance .504* .718** . .300 -.120 -.421* .110 .464* .234
Honesty .000 .000 -.110 . .050 -.250 .280 .110 .271
Emotionality .250 .060 .050 .190 . -.010 .030 -.150 .013
eXtraversion .000 -.190 -.020 -.370 .060 . -.130 -.470* .000
Agreeableness .080 -.140 -.090 .390 -.300 -.110 . .280 -.421*
Conscientiousness .000 .340 .240 .250 -.300 -.450 .210 . -.040
Openness -.110 .200 -.030 .260 .080 -.050 -.380 .080 .
The analysis of the latencies shows that without emotional priming (Fig. 5.6A)
P200 was peaking with the same latency for proposer and responder decision-
making. Moreover, in the responder condition without emotional priming an ad-
ditional positive component, occurring after P200, was visible along all midline
sites, but its amplitude was larger at frontal site (FCz). In Figure 5.6B the latency
of P200 tended to be longer in the proposer condition, although the diﬀerence was
not statistically significant. In the responder condition with emotional priming the
second positive deflection (second small bump in the red curves at latencies near
240 ms was also increased towards the frontal areas (FCz and Fz). In addition, the
second positive deflection was also observed in the proposer condition (blue dotted
line). Notice that at electrode site Fz in Fig. 5.6B the superimposition of the FRN
wave decreased the amplitude of the second positive component in the responder
condition.
In the proposer condition FRN was larger at frontal sites irrespective of the emo-
tional priming (blue dotted lines in Figures 5.6A and 5.6B). However, the emotional
priming reduced the visibility of FRN component in the responder condition. This
eﬀect is likely to be due to the superimposition of a broad positive deflection peak-
ing near 400 ms, labelled with an asterisk and an arrow in Fig. 5.6B at electrode
sites FCz and Fz.
Data from frontal electrode positions Fz, F1, F2, F3 and F4 displayed in Fig-
ure 5.7 emphasise the lateralization of FRN. The latency of FRN was bigger in
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proposer vs. responder condition at all sites, but in responder condition the ampli-
tude of the wave was similar at all frontal sites. However, it is clearly visible that in
the proposer condition at right frontal sites (F2 and F4) the amplitude of this wave
was smaller than at left frontal sites (F1 and F3). In particular, the diﬀerence be-
tween the rightmost frontal site (F4) and the leftmost frontal site (F3) indicates that
FRN appears to be associated to a lateralised cognitive process, as indicated by the
left-sided arrows in Figre 5.7. In the responder condition P200 was larger at central
site Fz than at lateral sites of either hemisphere. In the proposer condition the am-
plitude of P200 tended to be larger on the left hemisphere, somehow amplified by
the occurrence of an early positive component (Fig. 5.7, the right-sided arrow at F3)
peaking about 100 ms after the decision-making eliciting event.
Figure 5.8 shows five independent components (ICA-1 to ICA-5) accounting for
most of ERP variance at location Fz between 200 ms and 350 ms without emotional
priming [87]. For both experimental conditions, ICA-1 and ICA-5 fell into the same
time-range as the corresponding P200 and FRN ERP components. The ICA-1 com-
ponent accounted for 17% and 11% of variance in proposer and responder condition,
respectively (Fig. 5.8). The ICA-5 component, which explained 22% of the variance
for the proposer condition, and only 7% for the responder condition (Fig. 5.8). Three
ICA components (ICA-2 to ICA-4) were observed in proposer condition during the
early part of FRN, whereas only two ICA components (ICA-3b and ICA-4b) were
observed in the responder condition (Fig. 5.8). In the proposer condition, ICA-2,
ICA-3 and ICA-4 explained 15%, 17% and 34% of the variance, respectively. In
the responder condition, ICA-3b and ICA-4b explained 9% and 18% of the vari-
ance, respectively. The topographic distributions of ICA components are presented
on the right side of the corresponding ICA. Notice that ICA-5 is clearly lateralised
during the proposer condition, thus confirming a diﬀerent source during the respon-
der condition, as shown previously at Figure 5.7. The complex distribution of the
sources suggests the involvement of several brain circuits at diﬀerent timing during
the decision-making process.
5.6 Discussion
What role do aﬀect and emotions play in economic decision-making and, more
specifically, in willingness-to-share? Can we detect specific brain signals associated
to these strategic choices? To this aim we decided to perform an iterative version
of the Ultimatum Game, without a real payoﬀ and with a human player facing a
virtual counterplayer instructed to use a fair strategy that accept and propose also
uneven shares. Most pictures used to induce emotional reactions are real-life figura-
tive pictures, such as those of the Geneva Aﬀective Picture Database (GAPED) [26]
and those of the International Aﬀective Picture System (IAPS) [11]. Such pictures
have been shown to induce similar emotions in a large sample of people. However,
figurative pictures necessarily evoke past experiences of the participant and are cul-
turally related. We preferred to use non-figurative abstract pictures and to analyse
emotions associated with pictures for each participant in an idiographic fashion.
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Fig. 5.7 ERPs: Grand-average ERPs at electrode sites F4, F2, Fz, F1, F3 following respon-
der (red and solid line) and proposer (blue and dashed line) decision-making during the Ul-
timatum Game for all outcomes (both acceptance and refusal of the oﬀer). The labels show
the main positive component, ‘P200’, and the main negative component (‘FRN’). The right-
sided arrow indicates the presence of an early positive component at electrode site F3. The
left-sided arrows indicate the FRN at all electrode sites in the proposer condition. Notice that
the amplitude of FRN in the proposer condition is larger in the left hemisphere.
5.6.1 The Strategy of Acceptance
In the present sequential paradigm of the UG the proposer is constrained to guess
the other party’s response from the gains and losses experienced in the previous
trials and tends to oﬀer values more apart from the 5:5 share reported in a single-
shot UG [93]. It is important to notice that participants played alternatively the role
of proposer and responder, thus engaging them in a social scenario revealing their
willingness-to-share. The proposer must constantly reevaluate the decision rule in
order to optimise the next gain following an unpredictable outcome. This means that
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Fig. 5.8 Topographic distribution of independent component analysis of grand average ERPs
at location Fz without emotional priming. Five components (ICA-1 to ICA-5) are predomi-
nantly activated for P200 and FRN. Time envelopes of ICA-components are time-locked with
the ERP waveform for proposer and responder conditions. Notice the absence of ICA-2 in the
responder condition. Adapted from [87].
when the proposer takes the initiative he takes more risks and our results show that,
in this condition, the emotions significantly aﬀect the choice made by the partici-
pant. At first glance this result may appear surprising because the other party is a
virtual player, but the participants were not specifically informed of this fact. They
were actually unaware of who is the counterplayer and at the end of the experimen-
tal session they usually reported to believe playing against another human player,
the experimenter. This was demonstrated by the lack of main-eﬀect significance in
the factorial analysis of the total gains earned by human participants and by virtual
players. When participants knew they were playing with a computer, the rejection
rate was lower than when they explicitly knew they were playing with another per-
son [106].
Unfair oﬀers from friends are usually rated as being more unsatisfactory than
those from strangers, whereas fair oﬀers are rated as being equally satisfactory, then
interaction with friends may involve increased fairness consideration in monetary
distribution [120]. Results of the present study show that perceived emotions asso-
ciated to the background pictures and individual diﬀerences influenced diﬀerently
economical decision-making in the two experimental conditions. When individuals
were playing the role of proposers, they tended to share a higher amount of money
when their choice was made in association with negative emotions, in particular
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sadness and disgust. This result may be explained by the fact that participants tried to
regulate a negative emotional state by being more altruistic [21]. Moreover, feeling
negative emotions might have created a state of alert in participants, who responded
by trying to create social bonds rather than by being competitive.
Unfair oﬀers induce conflict in the responder between deliberative (“accept the
oﬀer”) and aﬀective (“reject the oﬀer”) motives [105]. However, any responder can
unilaterally punish the unfair proposer with a rejection. Accepting or rejecting an
oﬀer is essential in social decision-making as these conditions enable the responder
to contribute diﬀerentially to choices that are interpretable in terms of utility max-
imisation. This may explain why in our study we observed that responders tended
to earn more money than proposers and why participants were less aﬀected, if any,
by emotional priming when they played the role of responder. When participants
were playing the role of responders, they were more likely to accept an oﬀer when
their decision was made in association with positive emotions, such as joy and sur-
prise. This result is aligned with studies demonstrating that a positive emotional state
signals a benign situation and leads individuals to use simple heuristics and to not
question too much the situation [107]. Oﬀers in bargaining are likely to be guided by
the emotions that proposers anticipate when contemplating their oﬀers [89]. Positive
oﬀers may be driven by fear and guilt, where fear is more related to the perceived
consequences of having one’s oﬀer rejected, and guilt is more related to concerns
for the opponents’ outcomes [89].
Accepting the oﬀer posed surely less problems to the responder than rejecting
it, in that rejection could have compromised the relationship with the other player,
whereas acceptance conveyed willingness to maintain positive relationships even
in the face of unfair oﬀers. More conscientious individuals tended to accept more
often, a result that is not particularly surprising given that this personality trait re-
flects tendency to accept rules rather than to question them. Interestingly, introverted
individuals and more honest ones accepted more often, demonstrating compliance
with the proposer’s will. Indeed, more humble individuals tend to be more cooper-
ative in the UG [54]. Beyond being more compliant, we also found that individuals
accepting more often were those that made their decision in association with posi-
tive emotions. Higher rate of acceptance was associated with higher gain, thus the
strategy of accepting more often paid oﬀ. Of note, our results suggest that the fact
of accepting an oﬀer was influenced by a person’s disposition, rather than by the
rational decision that any, even small, amount of money was better than nothing.
Overall, it seems as if being in the ‘happy-go-lucky’ state of mind paid more than
retaliating to an unfair oﬀer with a rejection. It was reported that sadness was asso-
ciated with higher rejection rate in the UG [50] and our results further support the
idea that emotions play a fundamental role in decision-making. More conscientious
individuals tended to accept more often, a result that is not particularly surprising
given that this personality trait reflects tendency to accept rules and the status quo
rather than to question them.
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5.6.2 Event-Related Potentials
A series of cognitive processes is involved when we go out for shopping and we
face the dilemma of our willingness-to-pay with the willingness-to-sell of the other
party. Whenever we extend this real-life situation to an iterative sequence of trans-
actions aimed at maximising our willingness-to-share we always have to go through
the perception of the stimuli (here visual), decision-making, response selection and
response execution processes. In the present study, participants played alternatively
the role of proposer and responder in block series of the Ultimatum Game, while
we recorded their electroencephalogram (EEG) and analysed the ERPs triggered by
the decision-making eliciting event. In this chapter we do not present data on ERPs
related to the fairness of the share.
We observed several ERP components and the comparison between the two ex-
perimental conditions confirmed a positive-negative component waveform in the
150−400 ms time-range [113]. This waveform was more visible when participants
made an oﬀer (the proposer condition) and included a positive wave at a latency of
about 200 ms, ‘P200’, and a negative deflection, at about 250-300 ms, the ‘FRN’.
Another positive deflection, likely to be associated with greater attentional and
working memory resources activation, was sometimes following immediately the
parieto-frontal P200. Overall, our results support the hypothesis that several distinct
neural processes contribute to decision-making [8].
P200 is generated by the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex [68]. However, a shorter
shift in the latency of a positive-negative wave complex in the 150− 250 ms time
range was reported during specific working memory processes of a “n-back task”
[67] that involved top-down attention control primarily located over parietal elec-
trodes [86]. Another study described the emergence of a positive component in a
player that has to infer the current status of the rule from a relatively longer sequence
of outcomes [6]. This cognitive task requires the development of strategies that in-
volve attention and preservation of task-relevant information in working memory.
In UG the proposer has to store a specific value in the in short-term memory buﬀer
and, then, engage retrieval processes about the previous profit and stimulus-response
choices to enable his oﬀer after the instruction. An oﬀer in the UG constrains the re-
sponder to guess the proposer’s underlying rules from previous experiments of gains
and losses. It is known that the type of strategies to learn rules of classification, con-
junctions, or information integration is sensitive to cognitive, attentional, and load
constraints [116]. The time range of the positive-negative complex observed in the
present study exceeded the retrieval processes engaged in working memory, thus sug-
gesting additional processes are involved, especially during the proposer condition.
Decision making triggered ERPs, similar to choice-locked frontal negativity,
characterised by scaling with the risk of the decision in the anterior cigulate cor-
tex [64, 125]. We observed that FRN was clearly distinguished between proposer
and responder’s conditions. Feedback concerning monetary loss elicited a negative
deflection at the frontocentral regions compared with feedback concerning mone-
tary gain [40, 53, 57]. The FRN was particularly well observed at frontal electrode
sites during the proposer condition. A negative deflection, referred to as N2, is
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sensitive to tasks involving high level of conflict between competing responses
[82, 123]. A second negative wave of similar topography, referred to as N400, that
follows the N2 component was reported in cognitive control tasks that required con-
flict resolution [75, 76]. In an attentional orienting paradigm aimed to investigate
which mechanisms facilitate processing of attended stimuli both semantic and emo-
tional cues modulated negative ERP components (N400) associated to FRN [65].
The increase of high feedback outcome volatility was associated with FRN (i.e.
the frontal N2/N400 components) [6], thus supporting the hypothesis that the FRN
complex might be associated with the resolution of a conflict between competing
responses following a change in the outcome rule [5, 10, 62, 121]. Rule-based clas-
sification for decision-making includes hypothesis generation and testing and relies
on language shared by proposer and responder conditions.
In our study the topographical mapping of ICA components revealed one com-
ponent (ICA-5) of FRN in both proposer and responder conditions. Notice that the
ICA-5 component explained 22% of the variance for the proposer condition, and
only 7% for the responder condition. Moreover, in the proposer condition, ICA-
2, ICA-3 and ICA-4 explained 15%, 17% and 34% of the variance, respectively,
whereas ICA-3b and ICA-4b explained only 9% and 18% of the variance, respec-
tively. According to the literature the N400 component is strongly modulated by
stimuli that require recognition and semantic manipulation and it is related to in-
tegration/unification processes of executive control [72]. This interpretation sug-
gests that the participant was engaged in higher conflict-related resolution processes
while engaged in the proposer condition. This could also explain the larger latency
of FRN in the proposer vs. responder condition. Functional neuroimaging of source
reconstruction of N2 peak revealed specific frontal regions engaged in the proposer
condition, in particular the anterior cingulate activation, ACC [10].
The FRN is thought to reflect the impact of the midbrain dopamine signals on the
ACC [56, 90]. The phasic decrease in dopamine input, elicited by negative predic-
tion errors, would give rise to an increased ACC activity, associated with larger FRN
amplitude. On the opposite, the phasic increase in dopamine signals, elicited by pos-
itive prediction errors, would decrease ACC activity, thus showing a smaller FRN
amplitude. In our study we have also observed a strong lateralization of the FRN
towards the left frontal areas in the proposer condition. It is interesting to notice that
a left anterior P200 eﬀect was observed in attentional orienting to emotional stim-
uli [65]. Recent study show that unfair oﬀers in UG were rejected more frequently,
evoked more negative emotional ratings and elicited larger FRN than fair oﬀers [52].
FRN amplitude is smaller when an outcome is better than expected and larger when
the outcome is worse than expected [57]. We will report our ERPs results related to
fairness in a further study that will include a larger sample of participants.
5.6.3 Conclusions
Classic game theory would have predicted that proposers in the UG would oﬀer the
lowest amount possible and that respondents would accept any amount oﬀered, to
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gain at least some money. We found that proposers tended to oﬀer fair split and
very rarely highly unbalanced oﬀers. Positive emotions predicted higher acceptance
rate, and negative emotions higher amount of money oﬀered. Furthermore, human
responders were more likely to accept an unfair oﬀer when they were introverted,
conscientious, and honest. Although a higher rate of acceptance was associated with
higher gain, as the Game Theory would predict, our results show that factors oth-
ers than rational choice may aﬀect economical decision-making. These results sup-
port the hypothesis that participants based decisions on their willingness to share
rather than on rational strategies. Importantly, decisions made were influenced by
experienced emotions and dispositional traits [92]. In fact, emotions and individ-
ual diﬀerences predicted whether participants would accept an oﬀer and how much
money the proposer oﬀered. Our results are in agreement with data showing that af-
fect may diﬀerentially predict decision-making in the UG when participants played
both parties, as proposers and as responders [50, 119]. Furthermore, our study in-
troduces the role of personality and individual diﬀerences as factors aﬀecting eco-
nomical decision-making. In summary, our data corroborate previous findings indi-
cating the importance of emotional processing in decision-making. Although results
should be replicated with a larger sample, they suggest that Game Theory may be
complemented by keeping into consideration the role of individual diﬀerences and
emotional states in economical decision-making.
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